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INTRODUCTION
Stoic cosmology is an essential background for understanding the discussion of
the “coming day of God” in 2 Peter 3. I will argue that the use of Stoic language and
themes in 2 Peter establishes a unique paradigm for the interrelation of ethics and
eschatology. My argument will pick up on Jerome Neyrey’s thesis that 2 Peter perceives
an Epicurean polemic. By outlining elements of Stoic physics and cosmology, we shall
consider the relation of 2 Peter 3 to the Stoic doctrine of the conflagration. This will feed
a broader discussion of the central concerns of 2 Peter. Specifically, I will suggest that 2
Peter appropriates Stoic conflagration language in order to resolve the problem of
pollution in the Christian community.

iv

CHAPTER ONE
A DESCRIPTION OF 2 PETER

1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. Date and Authorship
Scholarship has generally regarded 2 Peter as one of the latest writings of the New
Testament, written sometime between 80 and 160 C.E. Several factors contribute to this
assessment. First, given the frequency of pseudonymous letter writing in antiquity,
especially in the New Testament, it is unlikely the apostle Peter wrote 2 Peter.1 In
particular, the volume of Greek ideas in the letter suggests the unlikelihood of Petrine
authorship. Second, 2 Peter is familiar with the apostle Paul (3.15) and several Gospel
traditions, most poignantly the transfiguration account (1.17). Therefore, we should place
the text no earlier than the Synoptic tradition. Third, Davids notes that the Apocalypse of
Peter, dating between 110 and 140 C.E., appears to have knowledge of 2 Peter, placing

1

For a summary of 2 Peter and pseudopigraphy, see R. Riesner, “Der zweite
Petrus-Brief und die Eschatologie,” in Zukunftserwartung in biblischer Sicht, ed. G.
Maier (Wuppertal: 1984), 127-133.
1
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the letter sometime earlier. 2 Our interest in Stoicism and 2 Peter does not require a date
any more specific than the approximate range of 80-140 C.E.
B. Relationship to Jude
Historically, interpretation has often been occupied with the literary relationship
between 2 Peter and Jude. For the purposes of this paper, we will work with the
assumption that 2 Peter had the text of Jude and appropriated certain portions of it
(specifically Jude 6-18). Though priority of Jude cannot be proven with absolute
certainty, other theories such as a common source scenario are conjecture at best. I share
the operative framework typical of most recent commentators: 2 Peter is dependent on
Jude in specific instances of language and structure but differs greatly in argument and
content. 3 For our study, consideration of Jude will be restricted to occasions in which a
comparison illustrates or magnifies the Graeco-Roman thought-world of 2 Peter.

C. Genre, Rhetoric, and Language
2 Peter opens in the form of a letter 4 with a salutation from Simeon Peter
addressed “to those who have received a faith as precious as ours...May grace and peace
2

Peter H. Davids, The Letters of 2 Peter and Jude (Grand Rapids: Eerdman’s,
2006), 131. See also, Richard J. Bauckham, The Fate of the Dead: Studies on the Jewish
& Christian Apocalypses (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 290-303.
3
See Richard J. Bauckham Jude, 2 Peter (Waco, TX: World Books, 1983), 140143. Davids, 2 Peter, Jude, 136-142. Daniel J. Harrington, Jude and 2 Peter
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2003), 233. Jerome H. Neyrey, 2 Peter, Jude (New
York: Doubleday, 1993), 120-122. Bauckham correctly notes that, “the literary
relationship between 2 Peter and Jude does not justify the common habit of classifying
these two works together as similar works, deriving from the same background and
context, displaying the same theological outlook,” 143.
4
For a complete outline of 2 Peter’s use of epistolary conventions, see Neyrey, 2
Peter, 111.

3
be yours...” (1.1-2). 5 The occasion of the letter is the imminent death of its writer (1.1315) with a stated intention: “...to keep on reminding you of these things, though you
know them already...” (1.12). The notion of “reminding” (ὑπομιμνῄσκω) the audience is
restated in 3:1 as the writer reveals that this is “the second letter I am writing to you.”
The repetition of the vocative ἀγαπητοί in the closing of the 2 Peter (3.1, 8, 14, 17)
heightens the audience’s awareness that they are being addressed by a clear authorial
voice; the overall tenor of the letter is rhetorical.
Unlike most New Testament letters, the text names no specific persons or
localities with regard to its addressees. Given this absence, Bauckham suggests that, “2
Peter is fictionally represented as written shortly before Peter’s death (1.14)” and thus
working in the mode of the testamentary genre. 6 In response, Charles has shown that 2
Peter differs from the testamentary writings in terms of structure and content, arguing that
we cannot restrict the letter to this genre. 7 The situation of an author writing in
anticipation of death naturally implies that the genre of the farewell speech is one of
several backdrops for reading 2 Peter. Important for us is the ambiguity of the document
itself: it is unclear whether 2 Peter addresses a specific Christian community. Moreover,
the lack of distinctive genre markers forces us to question whether readers would have
understood the document as working in a specific literary genre. 8

5

Biblical quotations are from the NRSV unless otherwise noted.
Bauckham, Jude, 2 Peter, 159.
7
J. Daryl Charles, Virtue Amidst Vice: The Catalog of Virtues in 2 Peter 1
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 49-76. See also, Davids, 2 Peter, 145-149.
8
Davids, 2 Peter, 143.
6

4
Nevertheless, 2 Peter exhibits features typical of Graeco-Roman rhetoric and does
so with skill and inventiveness. 9 Watson summarizes the arrangement of the document:
2 Peter contains the essential elements, and their subcategories, that should
specifically characterize deliberative rhetoric, and presents these elements in
correct order: exordium, probatio, and peroratio...there is a lengthy digressio
serving to destroy the ethos of the opponents in order to dissuade the audience
from adopting their stance. As is proper, these elements of arrangement are all
topically interwoven. 10
The topical structure of 2 Peter vacillates between the theological and ethical, concluding
with an explication of eschatological concerns grounded in the previous two. The clear
rhetorical structure suggests that the writer had some degree of classical education,
though it is difficult to say more with any certainty. 11
The style of 2 Peter is often described as grandiose and written in the Asiatic
mode of rhetoric. This categorization is somewhat misleading. Watson notes that 2 Peter
generally holds up to the “grand” style of Greek rhetoric, but does display the flaws of
“inflated language,” by using “new and archaic words,” and “compound and strange
words.” 12 So, too, Watson suggests that 2 Peter does not conform exactly to Cicero’s
description of the Asian style as “redundant and lacking conciseness.” 13 Thus, 2 Peter
does not fit neatly into a specific style; the writer displays skill, but, at times, his
language borders on being overwrought. This is not so surprising: the perceived
eccentricity of eschatological thinkers is often a consequence of brazen use of language.
9

Duane Frederick Watson, Invention, Arrangement, and Style: Rhetorical
Criticism of Jude and 2 Peter (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 146.
10
Ibid., 143.
11
Neyrey, 2 Peter, 120, observes that 2 Peter is a “Greek writer of solid, but by
now means aristocratic or Attic eloquence. If, as Cicero remarks, the stereotype of this
rhetoric truly belongs with the Asian people, then the author is more easily located
among the Hellenistic cities of Asia Minor.”
12
Watson, Invention, 144-145.
13
Ibid., 145-146.

5

2. Themes
A. Theology
The nature and role of God in 2 Peter’s worldview has a varying texture. On one
hand, God is the patron par excellence in relation to his clients—the whole of
humanity. 14 A description of God as patron opens the body of the letter: Ὡς πάντα ήμῖν
τῆς θείας δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ τὰ πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν δεδωρημένης (1.3a). In this

framework, the patron’s benefaction is communicated or transmitted to the client by a
mediator, σωτῆρος Ἰησου Χριστοῦ (1.1). Through the knowledge of Christ, the clients
receive God’s promises that allow them to escape (ἀποφεύγω) a cosmos corrupted by
desire and “become sharers in divine nature” (γένησθε θείας κοινωνοί φύσεως). 15 Claiming
that the client can somehow share in the φύσις of the patron complicates a strictly
hierarchical divine-human relationship. To be sure, the text does not suggest that humans
themselves become divine per se. Further discussion of this passage will be important in
our consideration of Stoic physics and theology in the letter.
2 Peter vigorously argues for God’s sovereignty and justice. In 2 Peter 2.4-9 the
writer alludes to a series of narratives in order to illustrate (a) God’s ability to judge and
punish, and (b) God’s ultimate fairness in doing so. Particularly interesting for our study
is the double allusion in 2 Peter 2 to Genesis 6 and the punishment of the Titans in Greek
myth. In Hesiod’s Theogony Zeus and his Counsel defeat the Titans in battle, bind them
in chains, and cast them into Tartarus. 16 2 Peter 2.4 describes the angels with the same

14

See Neyrey, 2 Peter, 145-146.
See James M. Starr, Sharers in Divine Nature: 2 Peter 1:4 in Its Hellenistic
Context (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 2000), for a full discussion of the
philosophical background of this passage.
16
Hesiod, Theogony, 687-744.
15
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details and uses the verb ταρταρώσας (“cast into Tartarus”). By alluding to a narrative that
establishes Zeus’ power and authority in the Greek pantheon, 2 Peter aims to reveal the
capability and justice of the Christian God in a Hellenistic mode. 17 The issue of theodicy
and providence is paramount for 2 Peter, particularly with regard to the ψευδοδιδάσκολοι
identified as the writer’s polemic (2.1). 18

B. Christology
Jesus Christ (only in 1:2 does he appear without Χριστός) has two main titles in 2
Peter: κύριος (1.8, 10, 14, 16; 2.20; 3.2, 18) and σωτήρ (1.10; 2.20; 3.2, 18). In 2:1 Jesus
is also referred to as the δεσπότης. Jesus as κύριος suggests that he possesses a ruler’s
authority and sovereignty, but this does not seem to place him in the same realm as God.
He possesses direct authority over humanity and denial of that authority results in
destruction (ἀπώλεια) of the individual (2.1b). Davids argues that the use of δεσπότης in
reference to Jesus implies that he supplants the authority of Caesar or other rulers in the
lives of the Christian community. 19 This reading fits nicely with the patron-client
theological framework established earlier in the letter.
Though the use of σωτήρ in 2 Peter seems to be merely a formal title, it does carry
some theological weight. Jesus labeled σωτήρ can be understood politically: perhaps this
functions as way of supplanting the authority of the Emperor who was often given the
same title. However, given the eschatological charge of 2 Peter, we should question
whether σωτήρ has any relation to the end of the world. σωτήρ appears twice in 2 Peter 3

17

See Neyrey, 2 Peter, 202.
See Chapter 1.3 for a discussion of the polemic in 2 Peter.
19
Davids, 2 Peter, 152.
18
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(vv.2, 18), but without direct thematic connections to the conflagration. The destruction
of the world in 2 Peter is concerned with judgment and purification, not saving or
deliverance. Interestingly, 2 Peter urges his audience to “regard the patience of our Lord
as salvation” (καὶ τὴν τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν μακροθυμίαν σωτηρίαν ἡγεῖσθε) (3.15). As they wait
for the “coming day of God,” the writer urges the community to understand God’s
patience and tolerance in salvific terms. However, there seems to be little relationship
between this claim and the notion of Jesus as σωτήρ.

C. Ethics
Proper ethical conduct dominates much of 2 Peter. This concern appears in the
opening of the body of the letter. In 1.5-7 the audience is given a model for living in a
world corrupted by desire.
(5) καί αὐτὸ τοῦτο δὲ σπουδὴν πᾶσαν παρεισενέγκαντες ἑπιχορηγήσατε ἐν τῇ πίστει
ὑμῶν τὴν ἀρετήν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀρετῇ τὴν γνῶσιν, (6) ἐν δὲ τῇ γνώσει τήν ἐγκράτειαν, ἐν δὲ
τῇ ἐγκρατείᾳ τὴν ὑπομονήν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑπομονῇ τὴν εὐσέβειαν, (7) ἐν δὲ τῇ εὐσεβείᾳ τὴν
φιλαδελφίαν, ἐν δὲ τῇ φιλαδελφίᾳ τὴν ἀγάπην.

(5) For this reason, you must make every effort to support your faith with
goodness, and goodness with knowledge, (6) and knowledge with self-control,
and self-control with endurance, and endurance with godliness, (7) and godliness
with mutual affection, and mutual affection with love.
Charles notes that this passage shares a number of common features with Stoic virtue
lists, and these elements are “adapted to the Christian paraenetic tradition” in 2 Peter. 20
This evaluation is appropriate, particularly when we read that 2 Peter writes in order that
“you may be able at any time to recall these things” (1.15). Several of these virtues are

20

Charles, Virtue Amidst Vice, 85. Charles’ concluding chapter (pp. 128-58)
offers a thorough discussion of the virtue list (1.5-7) with regard to Hellenistic
philosophy and ethics. See also, Arius Didymus, Epitome of Stoic Ethics, 5b1-5b5.
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noteworthy for our study. Self-control (ἐγκράτεια) will be contrasted with the dangers of
ἐπιθυμία (1.4; 2.10, 18; 3.3) later in the letter, specifically with regard to sexual self-

restraint. ἐγκράτεια leads to ὑπομονή (perseverance or endurance), another of the Stoic
virtues. The inevitability of the earth’s destruction requires perseverance: “...while you
are waiting for these things, strive to be found by him at peace, without spot or blemish;
and regard the patience of our Lord as salvation” (3.14-15). 21
The focus of each narrative allusion in 2.4-9 is also ethical. Angels are
condemned for acting sinfully; the righteous Noah is saved as the ungodly world is
flooded; the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah is an example of what will happen to
the ungodly; and the righteous man Lot is saved. After offering these examples, 2 Peter
is specific about the most flagrant participants of immorality: μάλιστα δὲ τοὺς ὀπίσω
σαρκὸς ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ μιασμοῦ πορευομένους καὶ κυριότητος καταφρονοῦντας (2.10a). The

remainder of 2 Peter 2 deals with the immoral behavior of the opponents before the writer
sketches his eschatological vision. We shall return to a discussion of ethics and
eschatology in Chapter 4.1.

3. Epicurean Polemic
In 2.1, the writer predicts “there will be false teachers among you, who will
secretly bring in destructive opinions.” As the chapter continues, 2 Peter outlines the
activities of those unrighteous ones who will be judged by God (2.9-22). These people

21

For a linguistic analysis of the virtues in 1.5-7, see Charles, Virtue Amidst Vice,
138-148, and Tord Fornberg, An Early Church in a Pluralistic Society: A Study of 2 Peter
(Lund: Gleerup, 1977), 97-101.
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are “like irrational animals” (2.12), have “eyes full of adultery” (2.14), and “speak
bombastic nonsense” (2.18). Moreover, “scoffers” (ἐμπαίκται) who indulge their own
desires will doubt the coming of the Lord saying, “all things continue as they were from
the beginning of creation” (3.3-4). Nevertheless, the letter contains no specific details
about its recipients or possible opponents, making it difficult to elucidate whether
specific individuals have targeted the community of 2 Peter’s audience. 22 It is quite
possible that 2 Peter only paints a general picture of his potential detractors.
In his seminal study, “The Form and Background of the Polemic in 2 Peter,”
Neyrey illustrates affinities between the argument of 2 Peter and Plutarch’s De Sera
Numinis Vindicta (On the Delays of Divine Vengeance). 23 In De Sera, an Epicurean
argument against divine providence serves as a polemic. The heart of the matter is
theodicy: the Epicurean position contends that God does not judge, reward, or punish
because God must be free from trouble (ἀταρξία). If God were provident, he would be
bound continually with the concerns of the world; because he is God (in the Epicurean
system of freedom) he cannot be subject to such concerns. 24
Neyrey further outlines the four arguments against providence used by the
Epicureans. 25 (1) Cosmology: Because the world consists of atoms passing one another
in a chaotic manner not guided by reason or divinity, a provident God is impossible. (2)

22

For a consideration of the methodological difficulties in identifying polemics in
New Testament epistles, see John M.G. Barclay, “Mirror-Reading a Polemical Letter:
Galatians as a Test Case,” JSNT 31 (Oct. 1987): 73-93.
23
Neyrey, Jerome H, “The Form and Background of the Polemic in 2 Peter,” JBL
99.3 (1980), 407-431.
24
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 10.139. All citations of
Greek and Latin authors are from the Loeb Classical Library (LCL) unless otherwise
noted.
25
Neyrey, “Form and Background,” 409.
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Freedom: Providence is deterministic, thereby limiting human agency and freedom. (3)
Unfulfilled Prophecy: Because the cosmos comes about by chance, there can be no
prophesying or divination. (4) Injustice: Justice is delayed; one can observe that the good
are not rewarded and the bad are not punished. The delay of divine judgment is a
particularly strong argument for the Epicureans: “but there is another absurdity...involved
in all this procrastination and delay of the Deity: that his slowness destroys belief in
providence.” 26 Consequently, the Epicureans reject any notion of the afterlife or postmortem retribution. 27 As Neyrey suggests, the Epicurean polemic against providence
...rests on the argument of injustice...expressed primarily in the complaint that
justice is delayed...God must be free from trouble (i.e. providence); and, the wise
man who strives for freedom from trouble (ἀταρξία), must reject all that
destroys his troubleless state...The formal argument of injustice therefore
functions in a coherent philosophy which rejects the triad of judgment, afterlife,
and post-mortem retribution. 28
Elements of this argument appear in 2 Peter’s perception of his polemic. In 3.9, the delay
of the Parousia and the slowness of God’s judgment are interpreted in a positive light. 2
Peter argues that God “is patient with you, not wanting any to perish, but all to come to
repentance” (3.9). Earlier in the letter, he insists upon the inevitable destruction of the
false teachers (2.1, 3b). Moreover, 2 Peter rejects the “promise of freedom” offered by
the opponents (2:19), possibly an Epicurean motive. 29 Given these statements, Neyrey
contends that author of 2 Peter is responding to the argument against providence similar
to that promulgated by Epicurean philosophy. 30

26

Plutarch, De Sera, 549B.
Plutarch, De Sera, 560F.
28
Neyrey, “Form and Background,” 411-412.
29
Ibid., 418-419.
30
Ibid., 418.
27
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Several other elements of the text suggest that the writer perceived an Epicureanlike polemic. 2 Peter makes extensive efforts to point out the immorality of his
opponents in order to defame their authority. In addition, he reveals that they deny that
the world is passing away (3.3-4) and believe that they will not be judged (3.9). Neyrey
describes this picture of the opponents:
Like the Epicureans and Sadducees, their happiness rests with their own radical
self-determination here and now. This is perceived by the author not as freedom
but as slavery to immorality which must lead to destruction. 31
We shall bear this in mind in our consideration of 2 Peter’s eschatological vision. How
does 2 Peter imagine the fiery destruction of the cosmos in relation to the portrayal of his
antagonists? Moreover, in what ways does the appearance of Stoic thought address the
problems raised by such an opposition?

31

Ibid., 420.

CHAPTER 2
STOIC THOUGHT AS A BACKGROUND FOR 2 PETER

1. The Stoic Ideology
Before outlining the philosophical elements of Stoicism pertinent to our
discussion of 2 Peter, it will be helpful to consider its cultural influence in the Hellenistic
world. Attention to this issue—primarily one of ideology—will provide us with an
appropriate frame in which to place the letter of 2 Peter. Of significant interest for us is
the dissemination and adoption of Stoic language in the Graeco-Roman world at large.
What about Stoic philosophy was so attractive for the people of the ancient
Mediterranean? How did the academic language of Stoicism impact culture and
knowledge? Finally, in what ways did Stoicism interact with imperial and political
power structures, especially after the period of the early Stoa? I will use the term
ideology in two senses: (1) as the manner of thinking characteristic of mass culture—
especially urban culture, and (2) as the system of ideas on which the individual bases
decisions (political, economic, religious and ethical).
Stoicism’s capacity to function as ideology rests initially in its claim to be
comprehensive. The Stoics held that the world and all its events were understandable
through reason and divided philosophy into three inextricable categories: logic, physics,

12

13
and ethics. 32 Stoicism’s contention that the world was a knowable and unified whole
allowed it to be intellectually accommodating. B.D. Shaw writes:
Like any other successful ideology Stoicism is typified by the extent to which it
could absorb other philosophies and exercise an imperialism of ideas. Hence, if
anything, Stoicism was by its very structure ill-defined and flexible, especially
about its ideological periphery where it shared amorphous points of contact and
overlap with existing idea systems...it was precisely the shapeless and
multifaceted nature of Stoicism that allowed the core of the doctrine to exercise a
determinant influence over peripheral ideas.33
The human being has the ability to interact with the world through reason in a way that
constantly aims to understand the part in light of the whole. Epictetus places the
capabilities of the individual in relation to the world:
...you are a citizen of the world, and a part of it...you possess the faculty of
understanding the divine administration of the world, and of reasoning upon the
consequences thereof. 34
With the presupposition that the unified cosmos was logically knowable, the goal of
human beings in the Stoic system is living in accordance with nature (φύσις), which was
identified with God. 35 Because the human has his own φύσις identical to the nature of the
universe at large, his purpose is teleological: live in conformity with nature,
accomplished primarily by proper moral behavior. 36

32
33

19.

34

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7.40.
B.D. Shaw, “The Divine Economy: Stoicism as Ideology,” Latomus 44 (1985),

Epictetus, Discourses, 2.10.3-4.
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7.88. A.A. Long
summarizes the Stoic outlook, “The coherence of Stoicism is based upon the belief that
natural events are so causally related to one another that on them a set of propositions can
be supported which enable man to plan a life wholly at one with Nature or God.”
Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1974), 108.
36
Epictetus, Discourses, 1.4.15, 1.12.
35
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Every aspect of the world is causally linked in the Stoic system. All that happens
is connected and in harmony with the whole. Much of this has to do with Stoic physical
theory (see below), but the notion of unified causality lends itself quite naturally to
ideology. 37 For the Stoics, nature is good, and meaning is inherent in the structure;
humans need only recognize the harmonious cosmos and live properly. 38 Moreover, the
rational being understands that hierarchy is built into the world (both in physics and in
the social relations of living things). 39 Social definition and role-playing is fundamental
in Stoic anthropology and sociology, and thus Stoicism could function as an acceptable
ideology; the individual should be concerned with fulfilling the duties of his or her role. 40
The uniqueness of Stoicism derives from the political landscape of the Hellenistic world.
No longer under the social rubric of the πόλις, the Stoics posited a system in which
humans could identify themselves with the entire universe. 41
A final note about Stoicism as ideology: the pliant nature of Stoic doctrine did not
necessitate a stringent orthodoxy. This allowed Stoicism to adapt and embrace
philosophies and ideas, and posit them in distinctly Stoic language. In this sense,
Stoicism yielded a “common ideological field, a common language of political thought
and behavior.” 42 The perpetuation of a common language is especially critical for our
consideration of 2 Peter 3; the use of Stoic language in a text that does not identify itself
as Stoic changes how meaning happens in that text. In short, meaning is a consequence
of language. The common language of Stoicism carries with it the possible referents of
37

SVF 2.945.
Epictetus, Discourses, 1.12.
39
Ibid., 1.6.12-22.
40
B.D. Shaw, “Divine Economy,” 32-33.
41
Ibid., 35-36.
42
Ibid., 49.
38
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the system’s central tenets. As such, the appearance of such language in 2 Peter should
prompt us to interrogate other elements of the text under the Stoic lens: our task will be
an attempt to “round out the discourse” of 2 Peter. It will be difficult for us to determine
whether the writer of 2 Peter is deliberately or intentionally using Stoic language. Perhaps
our writer is employing the language prevalent in his own discourse in a way that shifts
the “meaning” of the text. Moreover, an appropriate reading of 2 Peter will not force the
text to be Stoic when it is not. Given the ideological pervasiveness of Stoicism in the
Hellenistic world, it is our task to understand how the language of Stoicism affects the
meaning of a text that identifies itself as specifically Christian. 43

2. The Physical World
A. Stoic Physics
Stoic physical theory is a rather large topic and a thorough outline of its
intricacies cannot be discussed here. 44 Instead, I will attempt to summarize the basic
principles of Stoic physics, including some details about Stoic cosmology and theology—
both intimately bound up in the physical structure of the Stoic worldview. I will draw on
both primary sources and scholarly commentary, especially David E. Hahm’s seminal
study, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology. 45

43

For a discussion of the interaction of Stoic ideas in a New Testament epistle,
see Troels Enberg-Pedersen, “Stoicism in Philippians.” Paul in his Hellenistic Context,
ed. Troels Enberg-Pedersen (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 256-290.
44
See A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philoshophy,147-178.
45
David E. Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology (Columbus: Ohio State
University Press, 1977). For a discussion of Stoic physics in the New Testament see,
David E. Fredrickson, “Ephesians and Stoic Physics,” Word & World 22.2 (2002), 144154.
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For something to exist—for it to be real—it must be corporeal; this is the basis of
all Stoic thought. 46 Everything is body in their system: visible things, ψυχή, and even
God. 47 No void exists in the world because it is a unified whole, and only outside the
world does the incorporeal void exist. 48 With regard to the compositions of these bodies,
the Stoics proposed two principles (ἀρχαί)—the active (Nature, God, or Reason) and the
passive (matter or “a substance without quality”). 49 However, these ἀρχαί are only
separable on a theoretical level. The Stoics held that the active and passive principles
existed in an indivisible mixture that constitutes all bodies. 50 In short, the active
principle provides shape and movement to the passive unqualified matter. 51
This active principle was identified with fire and heat, which was also
synonymous with πνεῦμα—a biological life-giving entity—something like “fiery air.” 52
The πνεῦμα can have several functions. First, πνεῦμα is the ‘vehicle of the λόγος’, because
it works intelligently and artistically, not merely a physical combination of fire and air
that moves at random. Characteristic of the description of πνεῦμα is the fluidity in Stoic
physical terminology:
46

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7.135. Origen, Against
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Δοκεῖ δ᾽ αὐτοῖς τὴν μὲν φύσιν εἶναι πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὁδῷ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ
πνεῦμα πυροιεδὲς καὶ τεχνοειδές.

Nature in their view is an artistically working fire, going on its way to create;
which is equivalent to a fiery, creative, and fashioning breath. 53
Therefore, πνεῦμα is a generative force in constant motion; its heat was thought to be vital
and powerful for the growth and motion of bodies. 54
πνεῦμα suffuses both the entire cosmos and every individual body in it. In doing

so, “fiery breath” maintains bodies by holding them together. 55 This will be crucial for
the whole of Stoic cosmology. With regard to the traditional elements (στοιχεῖα), πνεῦμα,
conceived as a combination of fire and air, is associated with the active principle because
of its heat. In contrast, earth and water (both cold elements) are understood as passive. 56
In typical Stoic fashion, these four elements have a fundamental interrelatedness. The
πνεῦμα expands and contracts because of its hot and cold parts (fire and air).
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Hahm

describes the result of the dual motion of πνεῦμα:
In specific, fire and air (the active elements) hold together earth and water (the
passive elements)... 58 this motion has two phases, a movement into itself and a
movement out of itself...The state of the πνεῦμα in this activity is sometimes
called tension (τόνος)...Each phase of the pneumatic or tensional movement
produces its own result. The inward movement or movement toward the center
holds the body together and produces cohesion (συνέχεια), unity (ἕνωσις), and
being (οὐσία); the outward movement toward the periphery causes dimensions
and qualities. 59
Accordingly, Stoic physics prefers its bodies to be stable. This is achieved as forces
interact with the tension of the expanding and contracting πνεῦμα, yielding balanced and
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cohesive bodies. The dynamic substance πνεῦμα allowed the Stoics to conceive of
bodies—their movement and their integrity—as guided by reason (i.e. Nature or God).
On the micro-level Stoic physics is remarkably controlling: everything real is a body, and
all bodies exist because their internal forces are in a state of rational equilibrium. There
is no empty space in the world; every individual body is bound together. 60 Thus, Stoicism
envisaged a physical world antithetical to the randomness of Epicurean atomism. 61 Now
that we have a sense of the physicality of things in the Stoic world, let us consider the
implications of these tenets of Stoic physics on a macro-level.

B. Stoic Cosmology
The Stoics arranged the cosmos according to the four elements. The structure of
world is a series of co-centric spheres: earth in the center surrounded by water, air, and
fire (also called αἰθερία). A realm of planets and stars stands between the sphere of air and
fire. 62 In addition, all matter is derived from the four elements, each can transform into
another, and all are paired with a particular quality: earth is dry, water wet, air cold, fire
hot. The entire cosmos and its elements are stationed at the center of an incorporeal and
infinite void. 63
The biological character of the Stoic cosmos is especially apparent in accounts of
cosmogony:
In the beginning all by himself he turned the entire substance through air into
water. Just as the sperm is enveloped in seminal fluid, so god, who is the seminal
principle (σπερματίκος λόγος) of the world, stays behind as such in the moisture,
60
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making matter serviceable to himself for the successive stages of creation. He
then creates first of all the four elements... 64
In this case we see how God (the active cause) changes the elements into one another by
acting on a substance (οὐσία). Therefore, God’s role in creation is understood
analogically to the seed in the process of reproduction. 65 Importantly, fire was identified
with σπέρμα which possesses the “λόγοι of all things and causes of events.” 66 Hahm
suggests that, “the primary fire, which is actually identical with god, has the cosmogonal
function as did god in the account of Diogenes Laertius; fire is the seed and, as seed, is
associated with what Zeno calls the λόγοι of all things.” 67 Fire is therefore understood as
a generative on the macro-level. 68
Because the Stoics understood fire as a creative force, they had to deal with the
critique that fire is, at least empirically, destructive. Zeno dealt with this problem by
delineating two kinds of fire and placing them in relation to the celestial bodies:
...the sun and the moon and each of the other stars are intelligent and prudent and
have the fieriness of designing fire. For there are two kinds of fire: one is
undesigning (ἄτεχνος) and converts fuel into itself; the other is designing
(τεχνικός), causing growth and preservation... 69
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The designing fire is differentiated from the fire typically visible to humans, but the
Stoics were unwilling to make these separate elements. 70 The sun is considered a source
of the craftsman-like fire—analogous to the fire that maintains bodies. However, this
designing fire was also inevitably (and slowly) destructive because, in the absence of
void, the elements are converted into or consumed by fire. As such, the fire continues to
be fueled, resulting in a fully destroyed (consumed) cosmos. 71 This is the so-called Stoic
doctrine of conflagration, which we will consider in more detail in Chapter 3.
We have seen how πνεῦμα provides life in living things and cohesion in all bodies.
In keeping with the Stoic fondness for a unified whole, this conception of πνεῦμα
contributes to the notion that the cosmos is itself a living being. Like the human body
whose parts work together and are inextricable from one another, the cosmos is
understood as a biological entity. Moreover, just as the human ψυχή has its supervisory
or ruling principle, the ήγεμονικόν, so the cosmos is permeated by νοῦς and is guided by
αἰθερία.
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This holds the cosmos together and moves intelligence throughout the whole.

πνεῦμα, therefore, performs both a physical and psychological role in the cosmos.
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C. Stoic Theology
The Stoics associated nature (φύσις), fate (εἱμαρμένης), and fire with God; he is
intelligent, immanent and provident. 74 According to Plutarch, the Stoic God is “an
animate being, blessed and indestructible, and beneficent towards men.” 75 As we have
seen in Stoic physics, God is identified with the active principle. This move is crucial in
the Stoic divergence from Platonic and Aristotelian theology. Sedley writes that God as
active principle “sets up Stoic pantheism from the very outset with a breathtaking
decisiveness, enabling god to enter the physical world on the ground floor.” 76 In practice
God can be called Zeus or Jupiter, and the Stoics often used allegorical descriptions and
narratives of the Greek pantheon to describe God and the universe. 77 Expressions of
Stoic theology and religiosity are many, and a survey of some significant passages will be
helpful for contextualizing 2 Peter.
Providence (πρόνοια) is immensely significant in Stoic theology, often in
polemical relationship with Epicureanism. 78 God admits “nothing evil [into him]” and
takes “providential care of the world and all that therein is” 79 ; his substance (οὐσία) is the
whole of cosmos. 80 Because of his physical inextricability from body, the intelligent and
rational God participates in and controls the happenings of the world. Epictetus notes
humanity’s relationship to the divine by asking,
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But if our souls are so bound up with God and joined together with him, as being
parts and portions of his being, does not God perceive their every motion as being
a motion of that which is his own and of one body with himself? 81
The motion of God is inseparable from the motion of the human soul in such a way that
actions and events are under God’s control. In a sense, God percolates through all
bodies, controlling everything as the result of his physicality.
Epictetus has several empirical arguments for God’s providence. First he points
out the wonders of nature and animal life which are inherently linked for the benefit of
man: “milk is produced from grass, and cheese from milk, and that wool grows from
skin—who is it that has created or devised these things?” 82 He then notes the seemingly
useless characteristics of human beings (hairs on a chin, for example) and deduces that
these are signs given by God to distinguish between people and things. 83 Finally, he
urges the reader to praise God for his generosity in providing functioning bodies (the
power to swallow, the ability to breathe while sleeping) and, most importantly, the
capacity to follow the path of reason. 84
Claims about providence also led the Stoics to identify God with fate. 85 As such,
the Stoics had an extraordinarily deterministic worldview, often construed under the
rubric of physics. Temporally, this means that all future events have been decided in
accordance with nature: “nothing is going to be which nature does not contain causes
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working to bring that very thing about.” 86 Moreover, the Stoics recognize a sequence of
causality that occurs because of the divine ordering of the world. 87 The insistence upon
divine determinism creates a conflict with the Stoic supposition that the cosmos and God
are essentially good. This is the problem of evil and the issue theodicy in Stoicism. In
others words, (a) Does evil exist in a system where God, who determines everything, is
providentially good? And (b) why do human beings, for whom the world is oriented,
undergo hardship and suffering?
The Stoic πνεῦμα is crucial in dealing with the problem of theodicy because it
aims to give causal responsibility to a rational substance that pervades the entire
cosmos. 88 Stoicism contends that the chain of causation is entirely under God’s control.
In thinking about evil, therefore, we must bear in mind the Stoic interest in maintaining
the unified whole. When bad things happen, the Stoics do not deny that a cosmic
“badness” exists. However, to keep the goodness of the unified cosmos intact, they stress
how injustice and disaster actually serve in God’s plan. 89 As Long notes, “If moral
badness is the only κάκον, and something foreign to God’s nature, cosmic κακία turns out
to be only a human description of events necessary for the realization of the good on a
universal scale.” 90 Here we have the Stoic belief that the wise man always attempts to see
things in totality; one is always to comprehend the part in light of the whole, which is
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inherently good because it is determined by God. The virtuous human being will live in
accordance with nature by observing God in order to develop “right reason.” 91
We see a structural similarity in 2 Peter. Starr suggests that “knowledge of Christ”
in 2 Peter functions analogously to Stoicism’s notion of right reason.
The Stoics and 2 Peter agree that right reason/knowledge of Christ is what enables
a person to share in divine nature (1.4); they would also agree that a person must
align himself correctly to “the divine,” which requires a specific “knowledge” of
the divine, and then must focus his attention on his own moral actions. There is
thus a marked similarity of structure, especially in the position given to
knowledge of Christ in 2 Peter and the position of reason in the Stoics. 92
Just as the Stoics connect ethics with rational living, so 2 Peter understands proper moral
behavior as the foundational requirement for the individual who has “knowledge of
Christ.” Moreover, 2 Peter shares with Stoicism an insistence on the ethical
responsibility of the individual above all else.
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CHAPTER 3
2 PETER 3 AND THE STOIC CONFLAGRATION

1. Textual Problem
Before we can begin a discussion of 2 Peter 3 and its relation to Stoic cosmology,
we must deal with a textual problem that bears on our interpretation. 2 Peter 3.10 reads,
Ἣξει δὲ ἡμέρα κυρίου ὡς κλέπτης, ἐν ᾗ οἱ οὐρανοὶ ῥοιζηδὸν παρελεύσονται
στοιχεῖα δὲ καυσούμενα λυθήσεται καὶ γῆ και τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ ἔργα εὑρεθήσεται.

But the day of the Lord will come like a thief, and then the heavens will pass
away with a loud noise, and the elements will be dissolved with fire, and the earth
and everything that is done on it will be disclosed.
The word in question is εὑρεθήσεται (“will be found”), a future passive of εὑρίσκω.
Metzger notes that this reading is best supported in manuscript evidence; the “oldest
reading, and the one which best explains the origin of the others that have been
preserved” but is nevertheless “devoid of meaning in the context.” 93 A number of variant
readings have been suggested to deal with this issue. Significant manuscript evidence is
present that replaces εὑρεθήσεται with κατακαήσεται, meaning “will be burned up.” This
use of κατακαίω fits nicely with the subject matter, perhaps as stylistic maneuver,
complementing the verb καυσόομαι earlier in the sentence. Beyond this major variant,
Van den Heever summarizes the other verb replacements proposed by scholars:
93
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ῥυήσεται/ῥεύσεται (will flow or melt), συρρυήσεται (will flow together), ἐκπυρωθήσεται (will

be burnt to ashes), ἀρθήσεται (will be taken away), κριθήσεται (will be judged),
ἰαθήσεται/ἐζιαθήσεται (will be healed thoroughly), and πυρωθήσεται (will be burned).
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Scholars who maintain that 2 Peter 3 follows Old Testament models of judgment
suggest that εὑρεθήσεται should be preserved, quoting an array of LXX instances in which
εὑρίσκω appears to be synonymous with “( אצמto find”) in situations of judgment.
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Neyrey points to New Testament passages in which “finding” has to do with judgment:
εὑρεθήσεται “implies that something will be revealed, uncovered, and brought to light,

which might be goodness to be rewarded or evil to be requited.” 96 However, the biblical
parallels proposed do not help us understand the presence of the στοιχεῖα in the context of
2 Peter’s argument about the physical destruction of the earth. Moreover, though an
adaptation of Psalm 90.4 appears in 2 Peter 3.8, “with the Lord one day is like a thousand
years,” Old Testament passages do little to explain the presence of εὑρεθήσεται in 3.10. 97
Admittedly, this is probably an instance in which the textual problem is unsolvable. 98
Interestingly, Olivier’s replacement for εὑρεθήσεται is ἐκπυρωθήσεται, 99 a verbal
form of the technical term for the conflagration in Stoic physical theory, ἐκπύρωσις. This
rendering would be ideal for my argument about the Stoic background of 2 Peter, but the
manuscript support is minimal and we can only regard ἐκπυρωθήσεται as conjectural. We
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cannot say whether εὑρεθήσεται is the “correct” reading; however the problem is not
necessarily a crux interpretum for our study.
First, we should bear in mind that κατακαήσεται appears in a number of
manuscripts and fits well with the context of 2 Peter 3; therefore, it cannot be ruled out
entirely. Second, we should not disregard Neyrey’s suggestion that εὑρεθήσεται carries
the connotation of judgment, especially in light of 2 Peter 3.9. However, this does not
require us to harmonize 2 Peter 3 with an Old Testament paradigm of judgment by fire;
by considering Stoic cosmology I aim to show how 2 Peter operates in different mode.
Third, the deviation in manuscripts may reveal nervousness about the controversial nature
of 2 Peter’s eschatology—specifically its pagan connotations. 100 Finally, I want to stress
that 2 Peter is capable of using language figuratively. Perhaps εὑρεθήσεται would not have
been understood literally in a discussion of the dissolution of the cosmos and its
elements.

2. Stoic ἐκπύρωσις
We will now consider the Stoic notion of the cosmic conflagration which I briefly
mentioned earlier. There seems to be no clear reason why the early Stoics proposed the
notion of a circular cosmos—an infinite series of creations and destructions. Lapidge
outlines the three main explanations for the ἐκπύρωσις used by the Stoics. 101 1) The first
position is from Chrysippus as outlined by Plutarch: “Zeus continues to grow until he has
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used up everything on himself.” 102 In this case God increases in such a way that the entire
universe is absorbed. 2) The second explanation suggests that the celestial bodies, being
made of fire, consume the moisture of the world until the entirety dries up and catches
fire. 103 However, Lapidge notes that the Stoics believed the sun and stars consisted of
“creative fire,” not the ordinary destructive fire that required fuel or nourishment. 104 3)
The final position suggests that the conflagration occurs when the planets return to the
same position that they occupied at the beginning of creation. 105 None of these
arguments seems logically defensible or necessary in the unified Stoic cosmos.
Interestingly, the Stoics did use the doctrine of conflagration to prove the existence of the
void outside the cosmos. 106
Perhaps the biological nature of the cosmos best explains the Stoic doctrine of the
conflagration. Plutarch summarizes Chrysippus:
For, since death is the separation of soul from body and the soul of the universe is
not separated but goes on growing continually until it has completely absorbed its
matter, the universe must not be said to die. 107
In this sense, the Stoics maintain the eternity of the cosmos by casting their argument in a
biological frame. Eusebius, reporting Stoic teaching, shows the biological connection of
conflagration and cosmogony:
At certain fated times the entire world is subject to conflagration, and then is
reconstituted afresh. But the primary fire is as it were a sperm which possesses the
principles [λόγοι] of all things and the causes of past, present and future events.
The nexus and succession of these is fate, knowledge, truth and an inevitable and
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inescapable law of what exists. In this way everything in the world is excellently
organized as in a perfectly ordered society. 108
The cosmos is destroyed but the creative fire remains—understood as σπέρπα—and is
therefore the agent of reproduction, growth, and regeneration. As Hahm notes, this view
is analogous to the continuous cycle that all species of animals go through, and allowed
the Stoics to uphold the eternity of the cosmos. 109 The doctrine of the conflagration,
despite is logical problems, was an outlet for the Stoics to affirm the biological
organization and harmony of the world. 110
The belief in an infinite number of cosmic cycles led some Stoics to argue for the
phenomenon of eternal recurrence. 111 For many, this was the most embarrassing and
ludicrous element of the Stoic conflagration. The most famous summary of this position
comes from Origen:
Trying to soften the incongruities somewhat, the Stoics, I know not how, say that
everyone in one period will be indiscernible from those in the previous periods:
they don’t want Socrates to recur but someone indiscernible from Socrates who is
to marry someone indiscernible from Xanthippe and be accused by men
indiscernible from Anytus and Meletus...Those of them who were embarrassed by
the doctrine [of indiscernibility] said that there is a very slight discernibility
between one period and the events of its predecessor. 112
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Not only will every person live again in the next cosmic cycle, every event will occur in
exactly the same way. This is perhaps the epitome of Stoic determinism; the dissolution
of the cosmos into fire, its generative part, can only yield a new cosmos that is exactly the
same. That is to say, fire (God) has a limited economy of possibilities in the Stoic
worldview. The finitude of the physical world can only take a certain shape in accordance
with the inherent “capacity” of the first principles. Nevertheless, we have no extant
proofs for the Stoic doctrine of eternal recurrence, merely assertions about its
possibility. 113
But how did the Stoics actually feel about the fiery destruction of the universe?
Was it considered a welcome rejuvenation of the world or a terrifying bloody event? How
did they understand it theologically, given their benevolent and provident deity? Two
passages from Seneca are useful in discussing this issue. Seneca explains the life of a
wise man abandoned by his friends by comparing him to God during the period between
cosmic cycles:
It will be like the life of Zeus, at the time when the world is dissolved and the
gods have been blended together into one, when nature comes to a stop for a
while; he reposes in himself given over to his thoughts. The wise man’s behavior
is just like this: he retires into himself, and is with himself. 114
If we take this comparison seriously, we can make two theologically inferences: 1) Just
as the wise man is better off when he is with friends, so God is in his “more natural” state
when he suffuses all the substance of the cosmos. 2) Nevertheless, God requires an
“alone time” or “time out” to get his thoughts together so to speak—a kind of retirement
period for the deity to be in his pure and fiery state. In all of this, it seems that God
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maintains his overall goodness, wisdom, and providence. Moreover, there is a trust that
God will recreate the entire universe in a predictable manner with desirable results.
Another passage from Seneca offers a description of the conflagration from the
perspective of humanity. 115 In this account we read an almost contemporary projection of
a final apocalyptic scenario: rivers and mountains are destroyed, nations and people
become disassociated, a final flood “will kill every living creature, and in huge
conflagration it will scorch and burn all mortal things.” However, Seneca quickly follows
this portent with the assertion that the world is “blotted out in order that it may begin its
life anew.” After the celestial bodies have been burned completely, Seneca concludes
that, “the souls of the blest, who have partaken of immortality, when it shall seem best to
God to create the universe, shall be added as a tiny fraction to this mighty destruction,
and shall be changed again into our former elements.” Therefore, at least in Seneca, we
see a picture of the calamitous destruction of the universe, but one that is construed
positively—as rejuvenation.
Much is at stake for Stoic religiosity and theology in the doctrine of the
conflagration: “the attitude of the early Stoics toward the supreme creator and ruler of the
universe is not purely rational, but also emotional. This makes the part played by God in
the destruction of the universe a rather sensitive issue.” 116 This is a problem of theodicy
(a problem at the core of 2 Peter). However, in Stoic fashion, we must approach the
problem from the angle of physics.
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The matter in question has to do with the distinction between creative and
destructive fire: how strict was this dichotomy? Mansfeld argues, against Lapidge, that
the Stoics understood the fire of the sun to be destructive in the sense that it consumed all
other celestial bodies before Zeus consumed the whole. 117 This blurs the distinction
between creative and destructive fire used by the Stoics to uphold the traditional Greek
four-element schema. Mansfeld concludes that the Stoic fire slowly changes from wholly
“craftsmanlike” at the beginning of the cosmic cycle to dominantly destructive at the
end. 118 In this sense, the Stoic universe is slowly burning itself into destruction; the fire
that suffuses all matter, providing growth and movement, uses that same matter as fuel.
Fire is associated with the rational and benevolent God, and it is this same fire that brings
about the entire dissolution of the cosmos. As the material of the cosmos burns up, God is
returning to his “pure” and fiery form.

3. Conflagration in 2 Peter
We are now in a position to consider the conflagration prediction in 2 Peter 3
under the lens of Stoicism. A close reading of this passage will allow us to recognize
where and when 2 Peter echoes Stoic thought or diverges from it. The conflagration is
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introduced by referring to cosmogony: “...that by the word of God heavens existed long
ago and an earth was formed out of water by means of water” (ὅτι οὐρανοὶ ἦσαν ἔκπαλαι
καὶ γῆ ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ δι᾽ ὕδατος συνεστῶσα τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγῳ) (3.5). The Stoic cosmogony

had a similar understanding: the element earth comes about from the condensation of
water. 119 Interestingly, the verb συνίστημι (to hold together) evokes the insistence upon
coherence in Stoic physics. Earth, the center of the cosmos, is held together because of its
relation to water; God is behind this process by means of his divine reason (τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ
λόγῳ). Unlike fire and air that sustain themselves, the elements of earth and water need to

be “held together” in Stoic cosmology. 120 If 2 Peter perceives an Epicurean opposition, as
Neyrey has suggested, then it seems quite fitting that he would argue for the physical
coherence of the earth. Epicurean atomism displaced God’s providence by imagining a
chaotic physical world. 2 Peter, working in the Stoic cosmological framework, argues for
providence by appropriating a system in which everything is coherent body, guided and
held together by a pervasive divine λόγος. 121
To be sure, 2 Peter offers only a brief glimpse of Stoic physics. In 3.5 he does not
appropriate the exact terminology used in the philosophical descriptions of Stoic
cosmology. Rather than 2 Peter’s συνίστημι, the verb συνέχω is typically employed to
describe the Stoic notion of sustaining or “holding together.” 122 Moreover, 2 Peter
suggests that the agent of this “holding together” is τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγῳ. The normative
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agent of συνέχω is πνεῦμα (i.e. fiery breath), often related to the notion of tension
(τόνος). 123 However, this discrepancy in terminology does not detract from the logic and
argument being presented in 2 Peter 3.5: divine reason, a sort of all-purpose idea in
Stoicism, holds the elements together in a purposeful and providential manner. The
general framework of Stoic physics enables this argument.
2 Peter continues, “through which the world of that time was deluged with water
and perished” (δι᾽ ὧν ὁ τότε κόσμος ὕδατι κατακλυσθεὶς ἀπώλετο) (3.6.). The agent is here
again τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγῳ. The context has consistently been understood as one of
judgment: the scoffers who deny the “promise of his coming” (2.3-4) will be judged and
destroyed just as Noah’s generation perished in the flood. This is a possible
interpretation, especially given the previous reference to Noah and the flood in 2.5.
Nevertheless, given the similarity of 3.5 to Stoic physics and cosmogony, we might
pursue a different reading of 3.6.
In one sense, 3.6 is the inverse of 3.5: the earth came into being through water and
the world was destroyed by water. The terminology, however, is not congruent. 3.5
expresses the change and nature of the elements γῆ and ὕδατος; 3.6 argues for the
dissolution of the κόσμος by flooding. In Seneca’s version of the conflagration we saw
that floods could be part of the destruction of the world. 124 However, 2 Peter 3.6 does
not seem to suggest that the deluge was part of a previous cosmic cycle. In this sense, 2
Peter does not express the Stoic idea of eternal recurrence. It is possible to take 3.6 as an
allusion to the great flood of Genesis 7.11, but the text is by no means explicit.
Significantly, τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγῳ remains the agent in vv. 5 and 6. Though 2 Peter is not
123
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acting outwardly Stoic in 3.6, it is interesting that he understands τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγῳ as that
which a) holds the earth and water together and b) causes the destruction of the cosmos.
It is both “craftsmanlike” and destructive.
2 Peter 3.7 begins by making this very connection, and we see a continued
broadening of terms:
οἱ δὲ νῦν οὐρανοὶ καὶ ἡ γῆ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τεθησαυρισμένοι εἰσὶν πυρὶ τηρούμενοι εἰς
ἡμέραν κρίσεως καὶ ἀπωλείας τῶν ἀσεβῶν ἀνθρώπων.

But by the same word the present heavens and earth have been reserved for fire,
being kept until the day of judgment and destruction of the godless.
3.7b further establishes the notion that God will judge the wicked. 2 Peter will bolster
this claim in 3.9 by arguing that, against the Epicurean challenge to providence, God is
not slow to judge.
Fundamentally, this claim is made possible by the physical reality presented in
3.7a: the heavens and earth “have been reserved for fire” by the same λόγος of the
previous two verses. The phrase οἱ δὲ νῦν οὐρανοὶ καὶ ἡ γῆ seems to be an elaborate way
of saying “everything” or “κοσμος”, but is nevertheless ambiguous. 125 This certainly fits
with the fragment from Alexander of Lycopolis which suggests that everything is subject
to the conflagration. 126 The phrase τεθησαυρισμένοι εἰσὶν πυρὶ τηρούμενοι is interesting
when contrasted with Stoic descriptions of the conflagration. Generally, the Stoics do not
use τηρέω when illustrating the relationship between fire and the cosmos in the
conflagration. Fire is considered a constituent part of the world and is often associated
with the generative and creative πνεῦμα. That is to say, fire is always an active force in
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Stoic physics. 2 Peter’s use of τηρέω is ambiguous because it implies that fire will begin
its destructive action only at a given time—the heavens and earth are kept intact until the
appointed moment.
Perhaps this fits into the framework proposed by Mansfeld (fire changes from
creative to destructive over the course of the cosmological cycle). The Stoics do not
formulate their discussion this way, but the logic of 2 Peter’s use of τηρέω is plausible, if
not congruent with the Stoic worldview. Because 2 Peter frames the conflagration as an
occasion for judgment, he stresses the singularity of the event. That is to say, the
suggestion that cosmos is “reserved for fire” creates an atmosphere of suspense; this
destruction and judgment is inevitable—only a matter of time. God’s perceived delay in
judgment is actually built into the physical reality of the world. Against the Epicurean
denial of providence, 2 Peter believes that God controls the events of the physical world;
this physical world will eventually serve to destroy those who are not living in
accordance with the λόγος of God.
I want to suggest that 2 Peter is operating in two paradigms (neither of which is
necessarily free from the other). In the Noachian typology of judgment proposed in 2
Peter 2:5, the destruction of the earth by flood is understood as momentous—a specific
occasion. 127 In 3.7a this is only part of the assertion. We see an appropriation of Stoic
cosmological thought in the proposition that the heavens and earth will inevitably become
fire; fire will consume all things and that same fire has the ability to sustain itself in the
period between cosmic cycles. Due to the physical makeup of things, fire (another way
127
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of saying God in Stoicism) is slowly destroying the cosmos. At the same time, 2 Peter
suggests that this will result in a final cataclysmic judgment. The cosmos is being
maintained for the final judgment and destruction of the godless. Thus, we cannot be sure
whether 2 Peter intended one paradigm or the other; the text is not confined to either. My
treatment suggests that, given the pervasiveness of Stoic cosmology, readers could have
understood 2 Peter’s assertions in 3.5-7 in one, the other, or both. If we contend that 2
Peter 3.5-7 operates in the framework of the Stoic physical world, the theological
assertions of the letter take on a different shade. The God of the Stoics is identified as the
active principle and the determiner of things. What is provocative in 2 Peter is the
suggestion that the destruction of the cosmos, a physical inevitability, will nevertheless
be a means for the judgment and punishment of those who have gone astray.
Earlier we considered 2 Peter 3.10 with regard to a central textual problem. Let
us now examine its content under the lens of Stoic cosmology. The verse opens by
assuring that “the day of the Lord will come like a thief” in spite of the Epicurean
argument that God is slow to judgment (2.9). This continues the kind of eschatological
suspense introduced implicitly in 3.5-7: the coming of the Lord will be sudden,
extraordinary, and surprising for those not properly prepared. But, in keeping with the
Stoic notion that the conflagration of the cosmos is a gradual physical process, 2 Peter
suggests the manner in which everything will be destroyed. First, the future passive of
παρέρχομαι (“pass away” or “disappear”) is combined with an adverb unique in the New

Testament, ῥοιζηδόν (“with a rushing noise”), 128 to describe the destruction of the
heavens. Interestingly, nothing about this aspect of destruction has to do with fire, despite
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the suggestion in 3.7a that the heavens are reserved for fire. The implication is possibly
that the heavens (celestial bodies included) have dissolved into their constituent parts or
elements.
This necessitates a further description of the destruction of the στοιχεῖα, an issue
of contention in Stoic cosmology. We saw in Seneca’s conflagration narrative the
suggestion that heavenly bodies would be burned up before converting back into their
elemental makeup. As we have seen, the elements are the constituent parts that make up
the cosmos and everything in it. The Stoics held that these could convert into one
another. According to Chrysippus, the “whole world and its contents” dissolve (διαλύω)
into the elements at the time the world is destroyed; the process occurs as earth is
converted into water, water into air, and finally air into fire. 129 Fire consumes all the
others, presumably because it can use them as fuel. Moreover, Chrysippus suggests that
the στοιχεῖα can simply refer to fire, “because out of it the remaining elements are
composed by alteration and into it they get their resolution.” 130 2 Peter is clearly
following the same pattern in 3.10: the heavens pass away, before the elements can be
destroyed by burning.
2 Peter 3.12b repeats the proposal of 3.10, but does so in strikingly different
language:
...τὴν παρουσίαν τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμέρας δι᾽ ἥν οὐρανοὶ πυρούμενοι λυθήσονται καὶ
στοιχεῖα καυσούμενα τήκεται.
...the coming of the day of God, because of which the heavens will be set ablaze
and dissolved, and the elements will melt with fire?
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2 Peter repeats that God’s presence results in destruction by fire. Unlike 2 Peter 3.10,
3.12 uses the preposition διά to connect the day of God’s presence to the fiery destruction
of the world. Earlier the heavens were said to “pass away with a loud noise,” but in this
case fire is the agent (πυρούμενοι λυθήσονται). With regard to the elements, 2 Peter uses
the same form of καυσούμενα in 3.12 but pairs it with the passive form τήκομαι (dissolve,
be melted) instead of λύω. Interestingly, Philo uses τήκομαι in a discussion of the
conflagration to describe the conversion of earth into water, but does not relate the idea
directly to burning (καυσόομαι). 131 Plato uses τήκομαι to describe the processes involved
in the rotting flesh of a corpse and the conversion of flesh into blood. 132 This shade of
meaning may be significant in the biological nature of the Stoic cosmos. Given the
parallelism between 3.10 and 3.12 it seems that τήκομαι is a way of specifying the sense
of the verb λύω (in 2 Peter’s grandiose style).
In both cases, 2 Peter does not include the terminology typically used to discuss
the Stoic conflagration—ἐκπύρωσις or its verbal form. I am inclined to read the textual
variant κατακαήσεται and bear in mind that this is a synonym of ἐκπύρωσις. Perhaps the
writer is aware of its pagan connotations or its illogicality. The dubious nature of the
Stoic doctrine of the conflagration led many in the early church to shy away from the
term.
However, it is interesting that 2 Peter does not target any specific recipients of
God’s destructive powers. In fact God is never the subject of the verbs of burning,
destroying, or melting; they are all passive forms. We might interpret this in two ways. 1)
2 Peter may be nervous about attributing the entire destruction of the cosmos to God.
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This was the very reason some later Stoics such as Boethus abandoned the Stoic doctrine
of the conflagration. 133 2) Accordingly, 2 Peter may be casting the destruction in
primarily physical terms as a way of alleviating this theological concern. He upholds the
notion of Parousia, in accordance with the Christian tradition before him (especially
Paul), but perceives an Epicurean polemic that would scoff at a deity that destroys his
own creation. 2 Peter aims to maintain his providential and just God while showing how
the world comes to an end. His answer lay in Stoicism and its physical world that slowly
consumes itself by fire.
Though 2 Peter conflicts with some of the traits of Stoic physics, he is operating
within its ideology: bodies convert into their elements and are destroyed by fire. In
appropriating this system, the letter of 2 Peter struggles to be completely coherent.
Several thematic elements of 2 Peter 3 diverge from the Stoic doctrine of the
conflagration. Most poignantly, there seems to be no suggestion of the Stoic idea of
eternal recurrence. 2 Peter claims that after the fiery destruction, the new heavens and
new earth will be a place “where righteousness is at home” (ἐν οἷς δικαιοσύνη κατοικεῖ)
(3.13b). Commentators suggest that 2 Peter’s “new heavens and new earth” is derived
from Isaiah 65.17 and 66.22 and note that the renewal of creation is a significant theme in
2nd Temple Jewish apocalyptic literature. 134 This is a likely context for interpreting 2
Peter’s remarks in 3.13, but we should bear in mind that the Stoics believed in the recreation and renewal of the cosmos after its dissolution. The earlier comment from
Plutarch implies that the conflagration purged the cosmos of any evil, allowing the new
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creation to be good (τὸ δὲ ὅλον φρόνιμόν ἐστι τηνικαῦτα καὶ σοφόν). 135 Though 3.13 does
not exclude Stoic cosmogony and the notion of everlasting recurrence, it is unclear
whether 2 Peter is here working within the framework of Stoicism. I see this as an
instance in which the text of 2 Peter departs slightly from Stoic cosmology, perhaps
because everlasting recurrence was a controversial (and embarrassing) topic in later
Stoicism. 136 The Stoics were not explicit about the re-creation because it was not a
rational necessity of their cosmological system.
I have suggested that 2 Peter utilizes Stoic cosmological thought in order to
uphold God’s providence and refute his Epicurean opposition. Let us now consider the
relationship between 2 Peter’s eschatological worldview and the central theme of the
letter: proper ethical behavior.
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CHAPTER 4
PURITY AND ETHICS IN THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY

1. Ethics and the Conflagration
Charles has shown the affinities between 2 Peter 1.5-7 and pagan ethical catalogs,
particularly those of the Stoics: “Both assume the individual to be rational and morally
self-responsible. Both teach a doctrine of moral progress, even when the pagan
understanding of this progress is void of grace. The language and logic of virtue in Stoic
thinking come to expression in the ethical catalog as a teaching device.” 137 The ethical
list in 1.5-7 functions paraenetically and governs the literary strategy of letter: to remind
the community about the necessity of proper moral behavior. Therefore, the overarching
moral concern of the letter calls into question the common “early catholic” interpretation
that 2 Peter is dealing with a fading hope in the Parousia. Instead, argues Charles, the
issue at hand in 2 Peter 3 is the “ultimate moral accountability” of the community, and
the inevitable fact of the Parousia is being stressed, not the timing of such an event. 138
Our consideration of Stoic physics and the conflagration bolsters this argument. 2
Peter 3 employs language that alludes to a system in which the material world will
inevitably be destroyed by fire because of its physical makeup. To be sure, 2 Peter
departs from the Stoic cosmological and theological framework in significant ways by a)
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stressing God’s judgment of immoral behavior (3.7), and b) suggesting that the
community “hasten” (σπεύδω) the coming destruction (3.12). In this sense, the problem
of 2 Peter is the relationship between ethics and theodicy; moral disruption occasions a
discussion of the Parousia and God’s ability to judge. As Charles suggests, the issue 2
Peter 3 aims to resolve is “the relationship of moral man to matter.” 139 In doing so, 2
Peter reveals a shade of ambivalence. The destruction of the cosmos and divine judgment
are inevitable, but what will happen to those who live a moral life? 2 Peter urges,
“...since you are forewarned, beware that you are not carried away with the error of the
lawless and lose your own stability. But grow in the grace and knowledge of our Lord
and Savior Jesus Christ” (3.17-18a). The individual possesses the moral agency required
for living the Christian life. Through the knowledge of Christ, the fate of the human
being and the benefit of living the moral life are presupposed: 2 Peter concludes with an
exhortation for ethical living given the physical reality of the Parousia. In light of this
tension between ethics and eschatology, I propose that we also consider 2 Peter 3 in
relation to another concern of the letter: pollution and purity.

2. Miasma in the Community
2 Peter depicts his perceived opposition under the cultural category of pollution
(it is the only document in the New Testament to use the technical word for pollution in
the Hellenistic world, μίασμα). In 2.10 the opponents are described as “those who follow
the polluting desires of the flesh” (τοὺς ὀπίσω σαρκὸς ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ μιασμοῦ πορευομένους). 140
This assessment follows the series of narrative allusions that illustrate God’s ability to
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judge, and 2 Peter believes that these unrighteous ones will be kept “under punishment
until the day of judgment” (ἀδίκους δὲ εἰς ἡμέραν κρίσεως κολαζομένους τηρεῖν) (2.9b). 2
Peter 2 offers a harsh portrayal of the unethical behavior of these opponents, and the
pollution implied in 2.10 has to do with improper sexual conduct. This helps to qualify
the sense of ἐπιθυμία as it relates to the knowledge of Christ: 2 Peter envisages a
community that escapes the cosmos corrupted by desire in order to become sharers in
divine nature (1.4). The foremost corruption in 2 Peter’s worldview is improper sexual
ethics, construed as a polluting entity. 141 Sexually immoral individuals are understood as
pollutants, and are therefore dangerous to the community: “They are blots and blemishes,
reveling in their dissipation while they feast with you” (σπίλοι καὶ μῶμοι ἐντρυφῶντες ἐν
ταῖς ἀπάταις αὐτῶν συνευχούμενοι ὑμῖν) (2.13b). Though pollution can be understood

metaphorically, it should also be considered an imminent physical reality in the ancient
imagination. 142 The notion of pollution in early Greek religion is often related to ritual
purity. An individual in contact with a corpse was understood as dangerous and
contagious, and was not allowed to enter a temple. 143 2 Peter operates in a worldview in
which pollution could be a physical reality for the individual. For 2 Peter the unethical
behavior is a pollutant that is hazardous, contagious, and requires separation from the
community.
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In 2.18 we see a further exposition of those who participate in the “desires of the
flesh.” These figures “entice people who have just escaped from those who live in error.”
Here 2 Peter suggests that individuals are drawn away from the knowledge of Christ in
the “desires of the flesh.” Improper sexual behavior endangers the community in a
manner that is physically threatening. From 2.18 we might suggest that 2 Peter uses the
notion of sexual pollution metaphorically: “the desires of flesh” do not actually make the
individual “dirty,” but instead corrode the barrier between insider and outsider of those
who have the “knowledge of Christ.” However, Padel’s contention upon the physical
reality of the Greek world suggests otherwise. We understand 2 Peter as metaphorical,
but “desires of the flesh” as pollution suggests that the community must be once again
purified in some way. To read the text metaphorically does not place the same necessity
upon the return to a purified state. Because the purity of the community has been
compromised, 2 Peter must propose a method for its cleansing. We will see that this
purification occurs on the cosmic level in 2 Peter’s thought.
Following his assessment of sexual pollution in the community, 2 Peter
appropriates the language of pollution on the cosmological scale. In 2.20, he develops the
theological and ethical reality proposed by 1.4 (escaping a corrupt cosmos), but this time
describes the reversion of the opponents: “For if, having once escaped the pollutions of
the world through the knowledge of the Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, they are again
entangled in them and overpowered by them, their final state has become worse than the
first.” 144 Knowledge of Christ allows the individual to escape a polluted cosmos; a return
to the polluted state is always an imminent and dangerous possibility. 2.20 may refer to
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1.9b: “the cleansing of past sins” (τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ τῶν πάλαι αὐτοῦ ἁμαρτιῶν). καθαρισμός
denotes the process or force that counteracts the perilous nature of μίασμα. 1.9b could
refer to baptism (a lustral form of purification), and likely points to the conversion or
initiation of the individual into the community. A number of scholars have noted 2
Peter’s use of the vocabulary of mystery cults. We noted earlier that 2 Peter 1.9 refers to
the members of the community as those who have been purified (καθαρισμός) of their past
sins. Ritual cleansing as a means of purification was common practice for initiates of
mystery religions. 145

Soon after, 2 Peter 1.16-18 includes a brief account of the

Transfiguration in the vein of the synoptic tradition. 2 Peter labels the audience of
apostles who viewed this event as ἐπόπται (eyewitnesses). This is the technical term for
the highest initiates in the Eleusinian mysteries who saw Persephone reveal herself. 146
2 Peter’s use of the pollution/purification vocabulary is significant for the entire
argument of the letter. First, 2 Peter can use pollution language to designate behavior
that jeopardizes the stability of the community. However, he does not specify a group of
individuals (perhaps they are the same individuals who advance the Epicurean argument
against providence), and thereby the letter maintains a strong degree of ambiguity. As a
result, 2 Peter makes a connection between an immoral opposition (their ethics and
opinions) and the pollution of the cosmos on the macro-level. He employs the language
of pollution and purification to speak about the cosmological reality of those initiated into
the Christian community. When one has the “knowledge of Christ”—a result of
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purification (1.9)—the individual is thought to be safe from μίασμα in the cosmos, so long
as proper ethical conduct is upheld.

3. Purification of the Cosmos
It is expected that some means of purification occur when pollution is present. As
we have seen, 2 Peter has a heightened awareness of the organizing categories of pure
and polluted. 147 In his worldview things have their proper places, and he construes
immoral individuals as pollutants who are at once outside the community and
simultaneously a danger to it. In earlier Greek culture there was a need for purification
after the invasion of a community and this was typically done using fire. Parker writes
that purification by fire
...was the most potent renewal a Greek community could undergo, since, lodged
in the individual hearths of houses and the collective hearth of the city, fire
was the symbolic middle point around which the life of the group revolved...the
Messenians, it is said, once expelled all Epicurean philosophers, and then purified
the shrines and the entire state. 148
Thus, fire could be used for large-scale purification as a way of revitalizing and uniting a
community after some foreign presence had defiled its localities and persons.
Therefore, we should ask how 2 Peter understands the notion of purification. He
speaks of conversion by purification in 1.9, but suggests in 2.20 that those who are
polluted cannot undergo a new purification through the knowledge of Christ. 2 Peter does
not speak about the redemption or repentance of the unrighteous opponents. Despite his
insistence upon the knowledge of Christ and ethical conduct for “sharing in divine
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nature”, 2 Peter offers no means for the re-purification of the polluted. He will quote an
ancient proverb to illustrate this: “the sow is washed only to wallow in the mud”
(2.22). 149 Herein lies the core problem of 2 Peter’s framework of ethics and purity: if one
strays and participates in impure behavior, one can never be restored to the original
purified state. 2 Peter’s solution is eschatological: a final expansive purification by fire.
A fragment from Hippolytus attributed to Zeno and Chrysippus suggests that the
Stoic conflagration was understood as the purification of the entire cosmos:
προσδέχονται δὲ ἐκπύρωσιν ἔσεσθαι καὶ κάθαρσιν τοῦ κόσμου τούτου οἱ μὲν παντός, οἱ
δὲ μέρους. καὶ κατὰ μέρος δὲ αὐτὸν καθαίρεσθαι λέγουσιν. καὶ σχεδὸν τὴν φθορὰν καὶ
150
τὴν ἑτέρου ἐξ αὐτῆς γένεσιν κάθαρσιν ὀνομάζουσιν.

The language here is striking. The conflagration is “welcomed” (προσδέχονται) because it
will be a purification (κάθαρσις) of the cosmos and all its parts; corruption (τὴν φθορὰν)
will also be eradicated by the conflagration. Though we have no intricate physical
explanation for how this purification takes place, it is significant that the final destruction
of the cosmos is not characterized pejoratively. Because the entire universe resolves into
pure fire (associated with God), the entire process was understood as κάθαρσις; and it is
from this pure fire that the world is created. 151 Plutarch offers a Stoic explanation of the
positive results conflagration, albeit without the language of purification: “Whenever
they subject the world to conflagration, no evil at all remains, but the whole is then
prudent and wise.” 152
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See Bauckham, Jude, 2 Peter, 279-280, for a discussion of the background of
this saying.
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SVF 2.598. Jaap Mansfeld, “Resurrection Added: The Interpretatio Christiana
of a Stoic Doctrine,” Vigiliae Christianae 37.3 (1983), 218-221, suggests that this
passage shows influence of Christian eschatology which associated the conflagration with
purification.
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Lapidge, “Stoic Cosmology,” 179-180.
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Plutarch, On Common Conceptions, 1075D.
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The Stoic doctrine of the conflagration put positively provides the language of
purification for 2 Peter. He continues the Christian eschatological trend of the coming
day of God, but in employing Stoic cosmology, strikes a new chord. To be sure,
judgment for unethical behavior is one strand of 2 Peter’s thought regarding the
destruction of the cosmos (3.7). However, such a judgment is couched in physical terms:
“heavens and earth have been reserved for fire.” The destruction of the universe as
purification helps us to make sense of the whole of 2 Peter: a massive purification is the
only means of dealing with pollution and corruption of the cosmos (1.4, 2.20). Parker
suggested that the city or community could purify itself by fire. However, the reality of 2
Peter and his community is likely one of minority in which such an action could not be
undertaken. In the decentralized milieu of the Hellenistic world, 2 Peter employs
purification on a large scale with the help of Stoic cosmological thought. He moves from
micro to macro—from the vein of the Eleusinian mysteries to the realm of physics and
providence (i.e. from particular to universal)—all the while focused on ethical behavior
as the normative factor for his version of the Gospel. Purification will occur when all
bodies are dissolved into their elements and the entirety is consumed by fire. Starr
contends that, “the final conflagration in 2 Peter is not God’s reabsorption of himself, but
a ‘day of judgment and destruction of ungodly men’ (3.7).” 153 This reading is
appropriate: nothing in 2 Peter suggests that God will consume the entire cosmos as some
Stoics believed. However, as I suggested earlier, the use of Stoic language and ideas,
even in part, shifts how the texts makes meaning. The dissolution of elements into fire in
the “coming of the day of God” fashions a unique brand of Parousia in the New
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Starr, Sharers in Divine Nature, 156.
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Testament: God’s full presence results in the fiery purification of everything. The
pollution envisaged by 2 Peter is eradicated.

4. Conclusion
I have attempted to show how the Stoic concept of ἐκπύρωσις functions within the
letter of 2 Peter itself. Thiede and Mansfeld have offered helpful discussions of the
various interpretations of 2 Peter 3 and the Stoic conflagration among the church
fathers. 154 However, neither of these readings shows concern for the logic and literary
strategy of 2 Peter. As Charles has argued, I contend that 2 Peter’s fundamental concern
is the individual moral responsibility of those who have been initiated into the knowledge
of Christ. In addition, 2 Peter argues for God’s providence and ability to judge those who
participate in immoral conduct. In an interesting move, 2 Peter construes this unethical
behavior (“desires of the flesh”) as pollution (μιάσμα).
The ἐκπύρωσις-concept offers 2 Peter the language and ideas to address these
concerns. The Stoic conflagration is inevitable because of the physical makeup of the
cosmos; 2 Peter describes the dissolution of the cosmos and the elements into fire. This
cosmological reality refutes the opinions of those who scoff at the destruction of world
and God’s judgment (3.3-4). By using explicitly physical language 2 Peter assures his
audience about the ineluctable obliteration of everything. 2 Peter uses Stoic materialism
rhetorically: eschatology is no longer a matter of correct opinion or doctrine, but is
actually built into the world. The perceived Epicurean polemic and its chaotic atomism
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are repudiated; God’s providence is affirmed. 2 Peter concludes that such an
eschatological reality requires proper ethical behavior (3.11-18).
I have also suggested that the Stoic ἐκπύρωσις resolves the issue of pollution in the
community. The individual is purified of sins upon entrance into the Christian
community (1.9). Some have gone astray by participating in the “desires of the flesh”
and threaten the community as pollutants. The fiery destruction of the cosmos brings the
community (and everything else) back into a state of purity. Immorality cast under the
rubric of pollution requires some form of purification. With the help of Stoicism, 2 Peter
envisions this cleansing on a massive scale.
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